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Abstract  
Nanotechnology has provided a new window of opportunity to reframe state-science-society 
relationships. In particular the notion of upstream public engagement has been put forward. 
But while public engagement is seen as indispensable in the governance of science and 
technology (S&T) there still is a need to reflect on why, how, for who and by whom public 
engagement has to be organised. This paper describes a wide range of activities that were 
organised in the Netherlands to bring a public perspective into the development of 
nanotechnology. Our study shows that in order to better understand the complexities of the 
governance of science and technology, a new research perspective is needed. By reflecting 
on the relationship between informing and engaging, on the interaction between engagement 
processes within the societal, scientific and political sphere, and on organisational and 
institutional constraints, we present an outline of such a new research perspective. As well, 
we identify key themes for comparative research in governance of S&T within different 
countries.  
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Governance of Nanotechnology in the Netherlands – 
Informing and Engaging in Different Social Spheres 
Introduction 
The rise of nanotechnology in the aftermath of the biotech controversy has stimulated an 
active debate about the governance of science and technology (S&T). Politicians, business 
and science communities wanted to avoid nanotechnology becoming ‘the next GM’. This 
political climate created opportunities for new governance concepts, which sponsored more 
proactive and participatory approaches to potential societal issues related to nanotechnology. 
In particular a lot of attention has been paid to the role of public engagement in the 
governance of S&T. Mixed opinions about its relevance and legitimacy have led to attempts 
to develop a more comprehensive view on the role of engagement (cf. Chilvers 2010; 
Gavelin, Wilson & Doubleday 2007). 
This paper seeks to contribute to that research effort by analysing the way in which 
information and engagement processes shape the governance of S&T. Our approach is 
explorative, reflective and has a broad scope. Instead of evaluating a specific, one-off, public 
engagement event, we aim to identify and describe – over a time period of a decade – all 
kinds of activities that were organised to bring a public perspective into the development of 
nanotechnology. ‘Public perspective’ signifies all sorts of ethical, social and regulatory issues, 
which go beyond ‘narrow’ innovation and economic aspects of S&T development. We use 
this concept to trace activities in the governance of nanotechnology in the Netherlands: how 
the public and political agenda has been developed over time, which issues have been 
addressed in what way, and by which actors. 
In order to connect to the ongoing discussion about (public) engagement, we have structured 
our explorative analysis in clear reference to important shifts in the framing of state-science-
society relationships. The next section distinguishes six different types of activities that may 
play a role in the governance of S&T. The third section describes the ensemble of activities 
that was organised to bring a public perspective into the emerging field of nanotechnology in 
the Netherlands. Based on our case description we outline a new research perspective by 
identifying several relevant research themes in the governance of S&T. 
Activities to bring a Public Perspective into Science and Technology 
Intellectual and political framings of the relationships between the state, science and society 
enable and constrain the types of activities that are organised to bring a public perspective 
into the development of S&T. This section distinguishes six different types of activities within 
two dimensions: (1) activities may be aimed at either informing or engaging people; (2) 
activities may be aimed at influencing the societal, S&T or political sphere (see Table 1). 
Both dimensions relate to discussions on and experiences with the governance of S&T. This 
section introduces the two dimensions and the related six types of activities.  
Informing and Engaging 
The first dimension relates to the well-known distinction between the public understanding of 
science (PUS) approach and the public engagement with science (PES) approach. The 
United Kingdom is instructive, since this country experienced a late, but rapid paradigm shift 
from the PUS to the PES approach at the beginning of this century. Since the early 1970s, 
thoughts in the United Kingdom about the relationship between science, society and the state 
had been shaped by the public understanding of S&T vision (cf. Durant 1999). According to 
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this so-called information deficit model, scientists are knowledgeable experts, and the ‘public’ 
is characterised as having inadequate knowledge (Wynne 1995). Around the start of this 
century, the public understanding of S&T approach was severely criticised and the public 
engagement in S&T approach began to impact the policy discourse in the UK (Miller 2001). 
An influential House of Lords report, with the telling title Science and Society (House of Lords 
Select Committee on Science, Technology 2000), even dismissed the public understanding 
of S&T approach as a “rather backward-looking vision”, and acknowledged that science had 
to involve itself in a dialogue with the public. Somewhat later in the context of 
nanotechnology, policy makers and the science community began to make rhetorical 
commitments to the term ‘upstream public engagement’ (Wilsdon & Willis 2004). For 
example, the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (RS-RAE) called for “a 
constructive and proactive debate about the future of nanotechnologies [to] be undertaken 
now – at a stage when it can inform key decisions about their development and before 
deeply entrenched or polarized positions appear” (RS-RAE 2004: xi).  
 
Table 1:  Overview of the types of activities aimed at informing or engaging people in order to 
integrate ethical and social aspects into the societal, S&T and political sphere, respectively 
 
 Societal sphere S&T sphere Political sphere 
Informing Aim: One-way communication to 
inform lay citizens 
Label: Public understanding of 
science 
Aim: ELSI-research to timely signal 
problems and inform researchers to 
stimulate development of desirable 
solutions 
Label: classical ELSI-research, 
upstream reflection 




Engaging Aim: Two-way communication 
between citizens, experts and 
policy makers; TA to stimulate 
the public debate on science 
and technology 
Label: Participatory TA, public 
dialogue, upstream public 
engagement 
Aim: Engaging scientists in a two-
way dialogue with citizens and 
stakeholders to identify problems, 
and stimulate the development of 
desirable solutions 
Label: Constructive TA, real-time TA, 
upstream public engagement 
Aim: TA to timely engage 
MPs in the political debate 




The ‘new’ public engagement with S&T vision builds further on experiments with participatory 
technology assessment (TA) methods, pioneered by parliamentary TA organizations in, for 
example, Denmark and the Netherlands. At the end of the 1970s, in both countries the fierce 
nuclear energy debate had challenged existing relationship between science, technology, 
society and politics (Jamison et al. 1990). Public demonstrations put public authorities under 
pressure and created a legitimacy crisis of the State. As a result, controversies over 
technologies began to be perceived as a problem between the government, the parliament 
and the wider public, and public engagement activities regarded as a legitimate add-on to 
representative democracy (Van Eijndhoven 1997). During the 1980s and 1990s, a class of 
methods to involve a broad variety of actors in technology assessment were developed, 
which is normally referred to as ‘participatory TA’ (Joss & Bellucci 2002). This involvement 
has taken various forms, like citizens’ juries, scenario workshops, and consensus 
conferences (cf. Slocum 2003). 
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Informing and Engaging in Different Social Spheres 
In literature and many policy documents, the word ‘public’ in the public understanding of 
science and public engagement with science often refers to informing the general public and 
engaging societal stakeholders and citizens in the public debate on S&T, respectively. There 
is a clear need, however, to link these activities to the political sphere (informing 
policymaking and political debate) and S&T sphere (impacting research agendas). For 
example, in the UK it was stressed that upstream engagement processes needed to be 
linked to the political process, “by asking MPs to debate with constituents, allowing time for 
debate in Parliament and ensuring that all ministers (and not just the science minister) 
discuss the issue” (Wilsdon & Willis 2004: 58) and inform research priorities, “rather than 
government, scientists or other experts deciding what questions should be answered” 
(Wilsdon & Willis 2004: 59). In addition, as we saw, public engagement activities build on 
earlier experiences with stimulating engagement in policymaking and political debate. Also 
various informing and engaging activities guided towards the R&D process have been 
organised, as is illustrated by the experience in the United States with research on ethical, 
legal and social issues (so-called ELSI-research) closely connected to large-scale R&D 
programmes (see subsection: The Science and Technology Sphere).   
Accordingly, we want to map the activities that aim at informing or engaging actors from three 
relevant social spheres: societal, S&T and political sphere. These three spheres – or poles 
as Callon et al. (1992) names them – can be distinguished both by the actors constituting 
them as well as by the nature of their production. The societal sphere corresponds to the 
universe of the citizen, both as a user of technology and as someone who experiences the 
benefits and risks of technological change. Actors within this sphere are civil society 
organisations, like employer organisations, trade unions, environmental organisations, but 
also individual and groups of citizens. Within the science and technology sphere, certified 
scientific knowledge as well as technological artefacts are being produced. The main actors 
within this sphere are scientists and technologists, working within universities, public or 
private research centres, or high tech firms. The political sphere relates both to the 
parliament, its procedures, its culture and routines, and the members of parliament (MPs), as 
well as to the machinery of the government, including the civil servants working there. In this 
sphere, public policies are developed, politically decided upon and implemented. 
The Societal Sphere 
Above we have listed important shifts in state-science-society relationships in the UK and 
US. These shifts have been influential at the international level, but taken up differently in 
various national contexts. The case study in the next section discusses activities in the 
Netherlands. In contrast to the US and UK, the Dutch policy discourse about governing the 
relations between citizens, scientists and the state did not experience a shift in thinking in 
terms of informing about S&T to engaging with S&T at the start of the century. At the time, 
the Netherlands already had some sound experience with state-initiated forms of public 
debate and citizen participation (Van Est et al. 2002). In the early 1980s, already, the Dutch 
government had initiated the Broad Societal Debate around Energy Policy (BMD). Around 
the turn of the century, the Dutch Parliament asked the Government to organise ‘broad 
societal debates’ on cloning (1998-1999), xeno-transplantation (2000-2001), and GM-food 
(2001-2002). These public debates are concerned with informing the general public about 
societal aspects related to S&T and engaging experts, stakeholders and lay people in the 
societal debate in order to stimulate such debate. Moreover, these state-initiated debates are 
all characterised by a broad variety of activities, ranging from information activities, local 
debates and science theatre, to public panels and focus groups. 
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These experiences with government-initiated public debates, however, did not lead to a 
shared vision within Dutch society on how to organise public involvement on a regular basis. 
Over the years, the meaning of public participation has changed, constantly challenged by 
new types of developments (Van Est 2011a). Public participation in the mid1980s mainly 
referred to the involvement of organised civic society groups, and up to now, expert and 
stakeholder participation presents a widely accepted phenomenon in Dutch society. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, and in response to the upcoming ethical debate around 
biotechnology, the meaning of public engagement was broadened to include individual 
citizens. By the end of the 20th century, the government even came to equate public 
engagement with citizen participation. 
This became apparent during the GM-food debate ‘Eten en Genen’ in 2001. At the time, the 
government perceived that the GM-food debate had become a trench war between industry 
and environmental non-governmental organisations, and considered an attempt at bringing 
these various interest organisations together a useless exercise. The government chose to 
focus its efforts on the ‘general public’. The existing engaged civil society organisations 
(CSOs) were merely positioned as sources of information for the ‘general public’. The Dutch 
government thus narrowed the meaning of public engagement towards involving ‘pure’ and 
‘rational’ citizens, thereby side-tracking engaged civic organisations (cf. Gutteling et al. 2006; 
Laurent 2011; PAGANINI Project 2007). The government received a lot of criticism for the 
way it framed and organised the debate, and the environmental CSOs boycotted the state-
initiated debate. This shows that public engagement in S&T is a social and political construct 
(cf. Irwin 2001, 2006; Stirling 2008). 
The Political Sphere 
The information deficit model did not only concern so-called lay citizens, but also Members of 
Parliament (MPs). The aim to timely inform MPs about the developments in science and 
technology and their potential societal aspects forms the rationale of the classical approach 
to parliamentary technology assessment (TA), and this has led to the establishment of 
parliamentary TA organisations in various countries (cf. Van Est & Brom 2012). In the 1960s 
in America, a TA movement began that aimed to subject technological development to 
democratic scrutiny. In 1972, this idea led to setting up the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA). In the UK, the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) was 
established in 1989 to serve both Houses of Parliament. Parliamentary TA is built on the 
promise that the timely indication of probable beneficial and adverse impacts of technology 
will enable decision-makers to steer and regulate technological change in an anticipatory 
fashion.  
Even in countries where parliamentary TA is institutionalised, the involvement of MPs in 
social issues around technology cannot be taken for granted. Maybe the French OPECST 
(Office Parlementaire d’Evaluation des Choix Scientifiques et Technologiques) is the one 
exception to this rule, because the French MPs themselves do the assessments, supported 
by the staff of OPECST. Classical parliamentary TA works with an information-based model 
of politics, which assumes that MPs can deal with most political questions as long as they are 
adequately informed. This assumption has been proven to be problematic in practice (Decker 
& Ladikas 2004). To improve the impact a participatory model of communication was 
developed, in which issue framing and identification of information needs results from 
interaction between, in this case, TA practitioners and MPs. For example, the Danish Board 
of Technology developed a Future Panel method to involve MPs in thinking about the future. 
The Rathenau Instituut, the Dutch parliamentary TA organisation, organised various hearings 
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and expert workshops in cooperation with the First and Second Chamber of the Dutch 
Parliament. 
The Science and Technology Sphere 
Stimulating research on the ethical, legal and social implications of technology – so-called 
ELSI-research – also fits the public understanding of (social aspects of) S&T approach. ELSI-
research is designed to identify, at an early stage, the impact of science and technology and 
thus avoid future social, environmental, and health problems. It is also intended to stimulate 
the development of socially desirable solutions, for example, embedded in the design of the 
technology itself or in regulatory practices. The first ELSI-research programme was 
established in the United States in 1990 as part of the Human Genome project. Concern with 
the impact of new gene technologies led the United States to set up the ELSI programme of 
the Human Genome project, as “a new approach to scientific research by identifying, 
analysing and addressing the ethical, legal and social implications of human genetics 
research at the same time that the basic science is being studied. In this way, problem areas 
[would] be identified and solutions developed before scientific information is integrated into 
health care practice” (National Human Genome Research Institute 2008). ELSI-research was 
guided by faith in upstream reflections, organised in close contact with the R&D process, as 
a way to identify and avoid problems, and signal and stimulate the development of desired 
solutions (Van Est 2011b). 
Ten years later, so-called real-time technology assessment was promoted and publicly 
funded in the United States. With respect to nanotechnology, real-time TA was positioned as 
“the necessary and logical next step to ELSI”, which had been criticised for not been well-
integrated into either the science policy process or the R&D process (Guston & Sarewitz 
2002: 94). Real-time TA aimed at “integrating social science and policy research with natural 
sciences and engineering research from the outset”, and as such providing “a mechanism for 
observing, critiquing, and influencing social values as they become embedded in innovations” 
(Guston & Sarewitz 2002: 94). Real-time TA was inspired by the Dutch tradition of 
constructive TA, which aims “to broaden the design of new technologies” through the 
“[f]eedback of TA activities into the actual construction of technology” (Schot & Rip 1997: 25). 
Constructive TA is guided by the political idea that social impacts of technology should not be 
anticipated and accommodated from outside the innovation process, but rather within 
science and technology development itself (Schot & Rip 1997). 
Bringing a Public Perspective into the Development of 
Nanotechnology in the Netherlands 
In this section we discuss how activities and debates with regard to nanotechnology have 
been unfolding in the Netherlands. Our description draws to an extent on personal 
knowledge of the authors, who have been closely involved in discussions about (the 
governance of) nanotechnology in the Netherlands as TA practitioners working for the 
Rathenau Instituut (cf. Hanssen et al. 2008; Van Est & Van Keulen 2004; Van Est & Walhout 
2010). Here our objective is to reflect on the various initiatives in the societal, political, and 
S&T spheres from the perspective of informing versus engaging as discerned in the previous 
section. Instead of discussing a single public engagement event such as the societal 
dialogue on nanotechnology in the Netherlands, we have taken a long-term and 
comprehensive perspective to describe a whole ensemble of activities that were organised 
over the last decade in the Netherlands to integrate a public perspective into the 
development of nanoscience and technology. This approach enables us to identify which 
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types of activities have (not) been organised, the relationship between informing and 
engaging, the interaction between engagement processes within different social spheres, 
and to take a look at how organisational and institutional inertia in the governance of S&T 
was overcome. 
Agenda-Setting and Policy Development  
In the Netherlands, nanotechnology was established as a distinct field of scientific research 
in the early years of the 21st century. A foresight study (Ten Wolde 1998) conducted by the 
Dutch Study Centre for Technology Trends (STT) between 1996 and 1998 laid the 
foundation of a national research agenda. The study showed the importance of 
nanotechnology for electronics, materials, molecular engineering and instrumentation, and 
also recommended to pay due attention to nano-safety issues and set up research in that 
area. The STT informally approached the environmental organisation Natuur & Milieu (Nature 
& Environment) and the Rathenau Instituut, so as to organise a debate on the societal 
aspects of nanotechnology. However, both organisations didn’t see sufficient opportunity and 
priority to do so at that time. 
This changed in 2003. The Canadian Action Group ETC (Action Group on Erosion, 
Technology and Concentration) had picked up on concerns about nanotechnology in the US 
and called for a moratorium in the publication “The Big Down” (ETC 2003). This report and 
the response of the UK's Prince Charles received worldwide attention. In the European 
Parliament, the Greens organised a debate for which the ETC group was invited. In the UK, 
the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (RS-RAE) set up a Working Party, 
which in 2004 published their famous report (RS-RAE 2004). To the Rathenau Instituut this 
signalled that nanotechnology had reached the European political agenda. A political entry 
point for the institute was the advice to the Dutch government (Koeman et al. 2004) being 
prepared by an expert committee of the KNAW, the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences. The 
Rathenau Instituut wanted to broaden the discussion both in terms of content as well as 
actors, and published an initial agenda for a public discussion about nanotechnology (Van 
Est, Malsch & Rip 2004). 
The report by the Rathenau Instituut put forward the notion that nanotechnology 
developments should be understood in the broader context of NBIC-convergence (the 
convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive 
science). However, the institute acknowledged that nanotechnology would be the term to 
which policy makers, politicians and the public could meaningfully relate. The institute 
organised a first workshop in February 2004 on the issue of nano-safety. This meeting 
brought together policymakers responsible for physical safety affairs, CSOs and 
representatives of the Dutch nano-field for the first time. Over the course of 2004 a series of 
workshops followed, each focusing on the societal issues related to different application 
areas. The debate about nanotechnology was brought to the attention of MPs at the end of 
2004 through the organisation of a large public meeting together with the parliamentary 
Theme Commission on Technology Policy. 
Meanwhile the nano-scientific community had acquired funding. A large national research 
programme, NanoNed, was set up which ran from 2005 till 2010, with an overall budget of 
235 million euro. The research agenda of NanoNed contained a Technology Assessment 
programme (see subsection: Enhancing Reflexivity in Nanotechnology Research). Despite 
the STT’s advice, risk research was not taken up. At the same time international discussions 
about nano-safety increased, especially after a report by Swiss Re (2004) linked the scientific 
uncertainty about human and environmental risks to legal and economic reality. Dutch MPs 
asked the government how it would follow up on the KNAW advice. The government initially 
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answered that several explorative studies (De Jong, Roszek & Geertsma 2005; The Health 
Council of the Netherlands (Gezondheidsraad) 2006; Roszek, de Jong & Geertsma 2005) 
had been commissioned by several ministries, on the basis of which, if necessary, policy 
could be formulated. However, several MPs compelled the government to come up with a 
comprehensive policy for nanotechnology (Parliamentary Documents 2005). 
At the end of 2005, the government announced it would prepare a green paper. The Cabinet 
View on nanotechnologies (Rijksoverheid 2006) was strongly inspired by an elaborate advice 
from the Dutch Health Council (Gezondheidsraad 2006). This green paper set the scene for 
establishing a national strategic research agenda (SRA), which included societally relevant 
fields such as water and energy, developing a risk governance policy, identifying and 
monitoring social and ethical issues, and involving stakeholders as well as organising a 
public dialogue. The Cabinet View had been prepared by an interdepartmental working group 
ION (Interdepartementaal Overleg Nanotechnologie), which had been set up to coordinate 
activities across the various departments and to position the Netherlands in international 
contexts. 
ION is the institutional result of the agenda-setting activities from the years before. Writing 
the Cabinet View required integrating the different strands of public policy as well as 
distributing responsibilities across ministries. For example, the Ministry of Environmental 
Affairs got the lead in risk governance (see subsection: Dealing with Risks), while the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs became responsible for organising a societal dialogue (see 
subsection: Societal Dialogue on Nanotechnology). More importantly, these agenda-setting 
activities influenced the position of the government with regard to nanotechnology as such. In 
2003, nanotechnology was not visible at all in the public and policy domain. Over the years, 
engagement in the political domain developed around a number of reports. These reports 
both resulted from and further drove the policy agenda-setting process because the 
governmental demand for these reports mobilised organisations like the Health Council, and 
the (policy) recommendations within these reports often contained policy advice that guided 
further governmental action. 
Enhancing Reflexivity in Nanotechnology Research 
In the early 2000s, the three main nanotechnology centres in the Netherlands created the 
national research consortium NanoNed. Under the leadership of its chairman David 
Reinhoudt, NanoNed decided to include a Technology Assessment research programme 
already in 2002 (Rip 2009). This choice reflected the international trend of integrating ELSA-
research into large research programmes, like the US National Nanotechnology Initiative (US 
NNI). TA NanoNed was guided by the approach of constructive TA, and led by Arie Rip, one 
of the founding fathers of this TA approach. In a certain division of labour with the Rathenau 
Instituut that addressed the political domain, TA NanoNed aimed to bring a broad public 
perspective into the development of nanotechnology by closely interacting with ongoing R&D 
activities.  
In the activities of TA, NanoNed pursuing the overall objective of ‘Bridging the gap between 
innovation and ELSA’, an intricate relation between informing and engaging, can be identified 
as well. Engaging scientists in constructive TA activities required developing sophisticated 
socio-technical scenarios that could convincingly speak to the scientific practice in NanoNed 
(Te Kulve & Rip 2011). These scenarios were used in strategy articulation workshops, 
stimulating participants to broaden the scope of design choices. By 2011, a follow-up TA 
programme was included in the research programme NanoNextNL, which succeeded 
NanoNed (Rip 2010). In both programmes, TA was implemented as research programmes 
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conducted by PhD-students. Attempts for establishing Centres for Nanotechnology and 
Society like in the US NNI have not been made. 
Dealing with Risks 
By the time the Cabinet View was published in 2006, it had become increasingly clear that 
adjusting the regulatory framework for assessing the safety of nanomaterials would at least 
take a decade. It was commonly thought that the research needed for adjusting safety 
assessment as well as regulatory change itself preferably had to be coordinated at the 
European and international level. Accordingly, Dutch government officials and advisory 
bodies took part in international working parties and scientific committees (expert 
coordination). However, as long as safety assessment and regulation had not been settled 
on the international level, a national strategy was required to address issues of precaution in 
occupational health and product safety (involving stakeholders). The Health Council called 
for a risk governance scheme as developed by the International Risk Governance Council 
(Renn 2005). According to the Cabinet View, a recently adopted national strategy for 
managing physical risks (Parliamentary Documents 2006) already provided an appropriate 
risk governance scheme. In this subsection we discuss how engagement with safety issues 
developed. 
Following up on the Cabinet View, the government prepared an Action Plan on 
Nanotechnologies (Rijksoverheid 2008), which further specified policy instruments and 
allocated budgets. Prior to the Action Plan, first oversight initiatives were set up by the Dutch 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA), which prepared a first overview of 
possible nanoproducts already on the market (VWA 2007). The Confederation of 
Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) was asked to provide an overview of 
nanotechnology manufacturers. 
In preparing the Action Plan, another important policy design question concerned the 
organisation of both stakeholder engagement and public dialogue. To address this issue, the 
Rathenau Instituut interviewed Dutch CSOs and involved them in a round table meeting (Van 
Est & Walhout 2007). The CSOs argued that participatory activities should not delay 
governmental action on nanosafety issues. While the Rathenau Instituut was writing up these 
and other findings (Hanssen et al. 2008) it had close contacts with the ION working group, 
and in particular with the civil servants responsible for the societal dialogue. In the Action 
Plan it was decided to address nanosafety in a stakeholder platform, while other questions, 
like ethical issues, would be addressed in a public dialogue (discussed in subsection: 
Societal Dialogue on Nanotechnology). 
The Ministry of Environmental Affairs set up a stakeholder platform (the ‘Klankbordgroep 
Risico’s Nanomaterialen’) according to a well-known format: representatives of the 
government, industry, regulatory bodies and CSOs meet three or four times a year and 
inform each other about their activities. In this way, the government can test first reactions to 
its policy development, while others gain insight in national and international developments, 
for example European Commission initiatives. Paradoxically, the ultimate objective of the 
stakeholder platform – devising joint positions that can be put forward in international settings 
e government that any lack of government initiative in addressing versight and regulation to 
be settled at the European level. 
Occupational health, however, was seen as a more urgent issue. As a direct follow-up of the 
Cabinet View, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment asked the Social Economic 
Council (Sociaal Economische Raad, SER) for advice on this matter. In the SER, employer 
organisations and labour unions come up with joint advice to the government. The SER-
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committee presented its advice in early 2009, specifically addressing the question of how 
precaution should be understood and proposing oversight measures, guidance to best 
practices and preliminary exposure limits (SER 2009). In its response, the government 
indicated that the proposed measures were either to be arranged at the European level 
(oversight) or not feasible (scientific underpinning of exposure limits). MPs, however, wished 
not to be held back by the time-consuming European process and forced the government to 
come up with oversight measures and preliminary exposure limits. Moreover, parliament 
requested that fifteen per cent of the budget spent on the strategic research agenda for 
nanotechnology would be allocated to risk research (Parliamentary Documents 2009a). 
During the funding negotiations for NanoNextNL, the succeeding research programme of 
NanoNed in 2010, the envisioned national risk research was threatened to be removed from 
the national research agenda. Backed up by the request of parliament, several ministries 
prevented this from happening.  
In summary, the organisation of stakeholder engagement with safety issues was far from 
being straightforward. Both policy development and stakeholder engagement in the 
stakeholder platform were, to a great extent, constrained by the dynamics of the overarching 
European regulatory framework. When the same threat occurred to the outcome of the SER-
committee on occupational safety, the Dutch parliament stood up and changed directions 
and preliminary exposure limits on the work floor were established in 2011. In contrast, 
governmental initiatives for information exchange and sharing best practices at the national 
level (a national knowledge centre, pilot projects in different sectors) were arranged rather 
smoothly. 
Anticipating Social, Ethical and Legal and Social Issues in the Context of NBIC-
Convergence 
Social change and ethical issues constitute another cluster of challenges for the governance 
of nanotechnology. In the subsection Enhancing Reflexivity in Nanotechnology Research, we 
briefly described TA NanoNed, which addressed these issues within the S&T domain. For 
policy development, two cross-cutting design questions on process and content were at 
stake. The Health Council had called for a ‘broad committee’ for monitoring nanotechnology 
developments and identifying ethical issues. Such a committee was announced in the 
Cabinet View. Ethical issues identified by the committee could feed into the public dialogue, 
but which issues to be discussed depended on the range of issues and time-span to be 
covered. In the international debate, a number of ethical issues were associated with the 
broader phenomenon (and/or agenda) of NBIC-convergence: the synergistic combination of 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive sciences and 
technologies. For example, human enhancement has been a recurring theme in discussions 
about nanotechnology. Although such an issue clearly should be part of monitoring activities 
and ethical reflection, it is less obvious how it specifically relates to nanotechnology and how 
its sometimes speculative features should be part of public dialogue. 
Policymakers from the ION working group on ethical and legal issues were addressing these 
questions. At the same time, the Rathenau Instituut had further explored NBIC related 
developments in ambient intelligence, persuasive technology, synthetic biology and 
neurosciences. The institute actively sought to link issues in these areas to policymakers 
involved in strategy building with regard to new technologies. This resulted in close contacts 
with the ION working group and a number of expert meetings on neurosciences and legal 
issues, human enhancement, and robotics (resp. Rathenau Instituut 2007, 2009, 2011) 
together with the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. These 
ministries also commissioned a survey on the impact of converging technologies on future 
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security applications (Teeuw & Vedder 2007). Converging technologies were further 
discussed as part of the parliamentary trend analysis on biotechnology by the regulatory 
advisory committee on genetic modification (The Netherlands Commission on Genetic 
Modification (COGEM) 2010) and as part of the strategic knowledge agenda of the national 
government (Strategieberaad Rijksbreed 2010). All these activities were shaping knowledge 
agendas for policy, but at a rather explorative level. 
In contrast, discussions about synthetic biology, a prime example of converging technologies, 
did reach the parliament and did result in institutional take-up. In 2005 and 2006, the 
COGEM and Rathenau Instituut explored the emerging field of synthetic biology (COGEM 
2006; De Vriend 2006). The parliamentary debate that followed the publications of the 
Rathenau Instituut resulted in studies by the Royal Academy of Sciences (KNAW), the Health 
Council (Gezondheidsraad 2008) and COGEM (2008). COGEM and the Rathenau Instituut 
have formally taken up responsibility to monitor the (international) developments and debate 
in synthetic biology.  
The Rathenau Instituut took the kick-off meeting of the societal dialogue (see the next 
subsection) as an opportunity to launch a book (Swierstra et al. 2009) that linked the 
explorations on NBIC-convergence back to the debate on nanotechnology. In response, an 
MP posed the question whether a societal dialogue on converging technologies was needed. 
According to the Minister of Economic Affairs (in charge of the societal dialogue) a debate on 
nanotechnology was sufficient at that moment in time, since it would allow for discussion on 
concrete applications (Parliamentary Documents 2009b). A similar position was taken by the 
committee that organised the societal dialogue. 
Societal Dialogue on Nanotechnology 
The National Societal Dialogue (Maatschappelijke Dialoog Nanotechnologie), which started 
in 2009 and was closed early 2011, was the main initiative for informing and engaging actors 
in the societal sphere. In March 2009, the ‘Commission Societal Dialogue Nanotechnology’ 
(CSDN) was created and assigned the task of implementing “a broad discussion in which 
viewpoints and opinions could be expressed by all kind of stakeholders and publics” 
(Rijksoverheid 2009). The CSDN, which covered a broad range of expertise and affinity for 
different groups in society, created a three-step process of providing information, raising 
awareness and facilitating bottom-up dialogue activities. This approach was thought to be 
necessary because at the start almost half of the Dutch people (46%) indicated they had 
never heard about nanotechnology (CSDN 2010). The CSDN had a budget of 4.5 million 
euros and selected 35 projects after an open call for proposals. Experts of scientific 
institutes, CSO employees and media professionals were responsible for these projects, and 
they used a broad spectrum of media and (internet) tools to engage a variety of audiences. 
The CSDN secretariat featured the web portal Nanopodium, which disclosed descriptions of 
the various projects and meetings of the CSDN, and offered information and opinions about 
nanotechnology. 
CSO participation in organising activities within the societal dialogue was modest: only eight 
out of 35 projects. The necessary expertise for running ad hoc projects on a short term and in 
a professional manner was not always at hand within (smaller) CSOs. They also lacked the 
ability to monitor nanotechnology developments adequately (Hanssen et al. 2011). Still, the 
Dutch societal dialogue showed that available project funding has been a key condition to 
mobilise and integrate different perspectives into the dialogue project portfolio by involving 
small CSOs. For example, the broader context of NBIC-convergence was the subject of two 
smaller projects organised by a religious think tank, which has a network in medical ethical 
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reflection. Similarly, the perspective of peace and international development was included in 
a series of sub-projects. 
The CSDN evaluated the results of the societal dialogue and presented an Agenda for 
Nanotechnology to the Dutch government as input for policymaking (CSDN 2011). 
Notwithstanding the intended focus on societal and ethical questions, risk issues concerning 
(personal) health and the environment got most attention. The CSDN concluded that public 
perceptions of the innovation potential of nanotechnology were primarily positive, provided 
there is an adequate system for risk research, assigning permits and nano-oversight. In the 
various projects, participants made clear that information on nanotechnology is crucial to 
them and demonstrating an operating framework for nano-risk governance would increase 
the public acceptance of nano-applications. The dialogue increased public awareness of 
nanotechnology; at the end of the dialogue only 36% of Dutch people indicated they had 
never heard of nanotechnology (CSDN 2011). 
An interesting question is to what extent the societal dialogue resulted in what was intended. 
In the Cabinet View of 2006, the government announced to “enter into dialogue”. Two years 
later, this was changed in the Action Plan to a dialogue in which the government would hold 
an independent position. The CSDN formulated its recommendations mainly in terms of how 
to organise further dialogue. In its response, the government emphasised a need for open 
information and knowledge exchange. Responsibility for further dialogue and engagement 
was, however, left to initiatives of knowledge institutes, companies and CSOs. According to 
the government, public opinions with regard to dealing with risks confirmed the actual policy. 
Regulatory issues and challenges would be addressed by the actions and instruments as set 
out by the Action Plan of 2008, although the government as well observed that progress in a 
number of these issues (like settling a definition for nanomaterials or setting up oversight 
schemes) depended on the European regulatory process. Ethical and social issues in the 
context of NBIC convergence were considered insufficiently bound to specific products or 
scientific developments. Hence the government did not see reason to start engagement 
activities for these issues (Parliamentary Documents 2011). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our case description shows how each of the six different types of activities identified in the 
second section can be found in the case of nanotechnology in the Netherlands (see Table 2). 
TA NanoNed and later TA NanoNextNL were set up to inform and engage the S&T sphere. 
Many organisations were involved in informing the political sphere and various activities were 
set up to engage policy makers and MPs in the political debate on nanotechnology. Bringing 
a public perspective into nanotechnology in the Netherlands thus meant more than 
organising the Societal Dialogue on Nanotechnology, which, by the way, only started in 2009. 
In 2003, the societal debate on nanotechnology was just about nonexistent in the 
Netherlands. The debate had to be built up from the bottom (Van Est & Van Keulen 2004). 
However, the (upstream) engagement of citizens, but also nano-scientists, civic society 
organisations, policy makers and politicians, is not self-evident. The governance challenge is 
not only to integrate a public perspective by stimulating public debate on nanotechnology, but 
also by stimulating actors from the S&T and political sphere to become involved in the 
societal debate on nanotechnology. 
Informing and Engaging are Intertwined 
While the public engagement model seems to favour engaging over informing in the societal 
sphere (see the second section), our case study shows that both informing as well as 
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engaging activities play important, complementary roles. Already in the mid1980s, “Dutch 
policy makers saw the public understanding of science model and the public engagement in 
technology model as complementary” (Van Est 2011a: 643). Information and engagement 
activities always go hand in hand. Asking for information or advice is not neutral, but deeply 
political, as it forces both the organisation that asks for information and the organisation that 
is asked for information to define their political positions in the public sphere. For example, 
the government commissioning the Health Council to come up with an advice on 
nanotechnology was an important political event. In this case, the demand for information 
forces the Health Council to become involved and define its institutional position with respect 
to nanotechnology.  
 
Table 2: Overview of the types of activities that were organised over the last decade in the 
Netherlands to bring a public perspective into the development of nanotechnology 
 
 Societal sphere S&T sphere Political sphere 
Informing • Rathenau study (Van Est 
et al. 2004) 
• Societal Dialogue 
Nanotechnology (2009-
2010) 
• Foresight study STT (1998) 
• TA NanoNed (2005-2010) 
• TA NanoNextNL (2011) 
• Rathenau study on nanotechnology 
(Van Est et al. 2004) 
• Expert Committee Royal  
• Gezondheidsraad (2006) 
• Cabinet View on Nanotechnologies 
(Rijksoverheid 2006) 
• Dutch Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority (VWA 2007) 
• Action Plan on Nanotechnologies 
(Rijksoverheid 2008) 
• Rathenau study on nanodialogue 
(Hanssen et al. 2008) 
• Advice by Social Economic Council 
(SER 2009) 
• Agenda for Nanotechnology by 
Commission Societal Dialogue 
Nanotechnology (CSDN 2011) 
Engaging • Rathenau workshop on 
nanotoxicity (2004) 
• Series of Rathenau 
workshops (2004) 
• Stakeholder platform 
Sound Board Group 
Risks Nanomaterials 
• Rathenau workshop with 
CSOs (Hanssen et al. 
2008) 
• Societal Dialogue 
Nanotechnology: CSO 
participation in 8 out of 
35 projects (2009-2010) 
• TA NanoNed (2005-2010) 
• TA NanoNextNL (2011)  
• Rathenau workshop on nanotoxicity 
(2004) 
• Series of Rathenau workshops 
(2004) 
• Public meeting “Small technology – 
Big consequences” organised by 
Rathenau & parliamentary Theme 
Commission (2004) 
• Parliamentary debates (2004-2011) 
• Stakeholder platform Sound Board 
Group Risks Nanomaterials 
• Parliamentary round table hearing 
organised together with the 
Rathenau Instituut (Parliamentary 
Documents 2009a). 
• Social Economic Council (SER 2009) 
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Moreover, by formally asking for advice from the Health Council, the government obliges 
itself to react on that advice and, consequently, define its own position and communicate it to 
society. In turn, this is the starting signal for another round of engagement. The action-
reaction law not only counts for physics, but also for politics. 
Timely informative studies may drive the political agenda-setting process by legitimising 
political action and setting up particular engagement processes. The availability of 
information is not self-evident, but often needs to be generated by study. But money is 
required to do these studies. So an important part of the initial agenda-setting process is to 
politically allocate public money to generate information. Engagement processes may also 
generate valuable information, and can sometimes from a scholarly point of view be seen as 
qualitative types of research. Extracting information from engagement processes and 
communicating them, and integrating them into the societal or political debate on 
nanotechnology, requires a huge effort. An important lesson to be drawn from our case study 
is that engagement processes require custom-made information, as the dynamics in the 
various spheres differ. To engage nano-scientists, TA NanoNed required developing 
sophisticated sociotechnical scenarios that could convincingly speak to the scientific 
community. The same counts for the engagement of MPs, policy makers and citizens. One 
big added value of the Societal Dialogue was that it created a momentum and a budget to 
develop information on the societal aspects of nanotechnology that was accessible to the 
general public. 
Weak Connections between Different Social Spheres 
Parliamentary TA activities aimed at influencing the political decision-making process are 
sometimes criticised for working in isolation from society and science (Sarewitz 2005). In 
turn, public engagement activities aimed at the societal and S&T sphere are regularly 
criticised for being isolated from the political decision making process (cf. Hanssen 2009; 
Hennen 2002; Van Est 2011b). These comments suggest that activities aimed at informing or 
engaging one social sphere should also connect to or impact another sphere. Lyall, 
Papaioannou and Smith (2009) even warn for the “‘soft’ wrapping of governance without the 
underpinning of ‘hard’ government’” (pp. 270). In other words, they caution that activities 
organised to engage the societal or S&T sphere should not be at the expense of activities in 
the political sphere. These scholarly comments bring up two questions: (1) to what extent 
were the various engagement spheres connected to each other? And (2) to what extent were 
activities aimed at engaging the societal and S&T sphere at the expense of activities in the 
political sphere? 
In the case of nanotechnology in the Netherlands, the three spheres of engagement are only 
weakly connected. On the one hand, the political sphere impacts the societal and S&T 
spheres, by deciding upon the national strategic research agenda and the organisation of a 
Societal Dialogue. Moreover, MPs and nano-scientists were involved in the Societal Dialogue 
on a personal basis. But on the other hand, the Societal Dialogue had little impact on the 
policy making process and the R&D agenda, and activities within TA NanoNed had little 
influence on either the public or political debate. Guston and Sarewitz (2002) criticised ELSI-
research and claimed that real-time TA would be able to integrate its results into both the 
political and S&T sphere (see subsection: The Science and Technology Sphere). 
Interestingly, the Dutch TA NanoNed has never claimed an ambition to influence the political 
sphere. Something similar can be said about the Societal Dialogue. The task of the 
Commission Societal Dialogue Nanotechnology (CSDN) was to ‘implement a broad societal 
discussion’ and not so much to influence the political sphere. The Dutch case shows an 
institutional division of labour between activities aimed at bringing a broader public 
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perspective into the various social spheres. TA NanoNed focused on the S&T sphere, the 
CSDN (between 2009 and 2011) focused on the societal sphere, and the ION, Rathenau 
Instituut, Health Council and other organisations focused on the political sphere.  
However, with respect to the second question, activities aimed at engaging the societal or 
S&T sphere were not at the expense of activities aimed at the political sphere. Dutch CSOs 
argued that the Societal Dialogue should not delay governmental action on nano-safety 
issues, and the Rathenau Instituut put forward that argument in the debate on how to 
politically position and organise the Societal Dialogue. In Ten Lessons for a Nanodialogue 
(Hanssen et al. 2008) the Rathenau Instituut advised the government that any lack of 
government initiative in addressing the risk issue would only undermine the legitimacy of the 
broader societal debate about nanotechnology. Moreover, the government was advised to 
differentiate between the risk issue and the broader societal debate about nanotechnology, 
and to adopt different roles and different types of dialogue for these distinct issues. The 
advice to distinguish between and, thereby, disconnect different spheres of engagement, fed 
into the Action Plan on Nanotechnology, partially due to close interaction between the 
Rathenau Instituut and ION.  
Overcoming Organisational and Institutional Constraints 
Timing has always played a central role in the discourse on the governance of S&T. Activities 
need to be timely organised in order to be effective in bringing a public perspective into the 
development of S&T. Over the last decade, the need for timely information and engagement 
processes has been expressed most clearly and boldly by the word ‘upstream’. Our 
comprehensive longitudinal case study clarifies that ‘upstream’ information and engagement 
processes are not self-evident. On the organisational level these activities require capacity, 
awareness, willingness to get involved (organisational agenda-setting), expertise and money. 
When new issues come up there is often a lack of awareness and information. In addition, 
most organisations have an existing agenda, which is already loaded, and they will therefore 
often choose to wait and see which way the wind will blow. In the TA NanoNed programme, 
such a situation in S&T development was characterised as waiting games (Te Kulve 2010), 
which may cause severe institutional inertia and even deadlock. 
To overcome such an institutional deadlock there is a need for organisations that take the 
lead, for example by putting the cat among the pigeons, like the ETC Group did by publishing 
The Big Down (ETC Group 2003) and others that follow up on those activities (like The 
Greens which organised a conference on nanotechnology in the European Parliament). In 
the Netherlands, the research community took the lead in setting up a TA programme as part 
of NanoNed. TA NanoNed, however, primarily assumed responsibility for bringing a public 
perspective into the R&D process, and not in the societal or political sphere. With respect to 
the political and societal spheres, the Rathenau Instituut has played an important pro-active 
mediating role. This organisation has the institutional task to stimulate the public and political 
debate, and has the budget, organisational culture, capacity and independence to play such 
a role. The Dutch parliament, too, played a decisive role in counteracting several waiting 
games, for example, by pushing the government to come up with an integral policy plan on 
nanotechnology, and to develop preliminary exposure limits on the work floor. 
For organisations such as the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
(RIVM) it is much harder to set the agenda, since their work programme first needs 
governmental approval. Still, the involvement of organisations such as RIVM, VWA and 
Health Council is crucial for further institutionalisation of the debate on nanotechnology. 
Besides organisations that can act as first movers and institutions that can exercise political 
power, such as parliament, many expert organisations are needed to generate information, 
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which can legitimise further action. In the Netherlands, the work of organisations like the 
Health Council and RIVM has been crucial in developing an agenda and legitimising further 
steps.  
Conclusion : The Need for a New Research Perspective 
This paper studied the ensemble of activities that were organised to bring and integrate 
public perspectives into the development of nanotechnology in the Netherlands over a long 
period of time. Our study suggests that in order to better understand the complexities of the 
governance of S&T, a new research perspective is needed. By reflecting on (1) the 
relationship between informing and engaging, (2) the interaction between engagement 
processes within the societal, S&T and political sphere, and (3) the organisational and 
institutional constraints, we presented the outline of such a new research perspective. As 
well, we identified three key themes for comparative research in the governance of S&T 
within different countries.  
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